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Abstract
We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new
policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is
privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information and we
exclude monetary transfers, but the principal can verify an agent’s information at
a cost. We characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the
principal. This mechanism can be implemented as a cardinal voting rule, in which
agents can either cast a baseline vote, indicating only whether they are in favor of
the new policy, or they make specific claims about their type. The principal gives
more weight to specific claims and verifies a claim whenever it is decisive.
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1 Introduction
The usual mechanism design paradigm assumes that agents have private information and
the only way to learn this information is by giving agents incentives to reveal it truthfully.
This is a suitable model for many situations, most importantly when agents have private
information about their preferences. But there are a number of environments where
agents’ private information is based on hard facts. This could enable an outside party to
learn the private information of the agents, at a potentially significant cost.
For example, consider a CEO in a company who faces an investment decision. Board
members have relevant information but could have misaligned incentives because the in-
vestment has different effects on different divisions. The CEO can take the information
provided by a board member at face value or hire consultants to check, various claims
made by a board member. Another example are large mergers in the EU, which must be
approved by the European Commission. If a proposed merger has a potentially large im-
pact and its evaluation is not clear, a detailed investigation is initiated. The Commission
collects information from the merging companies, third parties and competitors. Accord-
ing to the Commission, this investigation “typically involves more extensive information
gathering, including companies’ internal documents, extensive economic data, more de-
tailed questionnaires to market participants, and/or site visits”. The analyses carried out
by the Commission on potential efficiency gains requires that “claimed efficiencies must
be verifiable” (European Union 2013). Lastly consider an example, taken from Sweden,
on the decision of whether a newly approved pharmaceutical drug should be subsidized.
A producer of a drug can apply for a subsidy by providing arguments for the clinical
and cost-effectiveness of the drug. Other stakeholders are also given an opportunity to
participate in the deliberations by contributing information relevant to the decision. Im-
portantly, the applicant and other stakeholders should provide documentation supporting
their claims (Pharmaceutical Benefits Board 2019).
In order to study such situations, we formulate a model with costly verification in
which a principal decides between introducing a new policy and maintaining the status
quo. The principal’s optimal choice depends on agents’ private information, summarized
by each agent i’s type ti P R. Agents can be in favor of or against the new policy, and they
are strategic in revealing their information since it influences the decision made by the
principal. We exclude monetary transfers, but before taking the decision the principal can
verify any agent and learn his information at a cost ci. We determine the mechanisms that
maximizes the expected payoff of the principal; it optimally solves the trade-off between
the benefits from using detailed information as input to the decision rule and the implied
costs from verifying agents’ claims to make the mechanism incentive compatible.
In the optimal mechanism, agents can vote in favor or against the new policy; moreover,
they have the option to report their exact type. If agent i reports his type, the principal
adjusts the reported type by the verification cost ci to obtain agent i’s net type, which is
ti ´ ci if i votes in favor and ti ` ci if he votes against (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
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If an agent does not report his type the principal assumes this agent has a default net
type, namely ω`i if he voted in favor of the new policy and ω
´
i if he voted against. This
induces bunching, since an agent who is in favor only reports his type if it is high enough
and otherwise only casts a vote (and conversely if he is against). The optimal decision
rule for the principal is then to implement the new policy whenever the sum of net types
is positive. A report is decisive whenever it changes the decision compared to this agent
not sending a report; in the optimal mechanism each decisive report is verified.
type
net type
ti ` ci
ω´i
ω`i
ti ´ ci
Figure 1: Illustration of how types are transformed to net types. The principal
implements the new policy whenever the sum of net types is positive.
Our analysis provides at least two important insights for the design of mechanisms
in applications similar to our model. We will illustrate them by connecting our analysis
to the European Commission’s decision on whether to approve a merger. In a merger
review, the Commission “analyses claimed efficiencies which the companies could achieve
when merged together. If the positive effects of such efficiencies for consumers would out-
weigh the mergers’ negative effects, the merger can be cleared” (European Union 2013).
Our analysis suggests, first, that the Commission should not always use claimed effi-
ciencies (which must be verifiable), but might benefit by assuming that a merger has a
predetermined estimated efficiency gain, even if they provide no verifiable documentation.
Moreover, it might be beneficial to discount efficiency claims that are difficult and expen-
sive to verify. Second, before starting the process of verifying claimed efficiencies and
other reports, the Commission should first determine which reports are decisive and sub-
sequently verify only those. While there are other verification rules that could be used,
this is a particularly simple rule that is easy to implement in practice and it provides
robust incentives for truth-telling.
To explain the intuition behind the optimal mechanism, we now describe in more detail
our main results. We show first that the principal can, without loss of generality, use an
incentive compatible direct mechanism, which can be implemented as follows. In the first
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step, agents communicate their information. For each profile of reports, a mechanism then
provides answers to three questions: First, which reports should be verified (verification
rule)? Second, what is the decision regarding the new policy (decision rule)? Finally,
what is the penalty when someone is revealed to be lying? Because we can focus on
incentive compatible mechanisms, penalties will be imposed only off the equilibrium path.
The principal can therefore always choose the severest possible penalty, as this weakens
incentive constraints but does not affect the decision made on the equilibrium path. In
general, the principal can implement any decision rule by always verifying all agents.
However, the principal has to make a trade-off between using detailed information for
“good” decisions and incurring the costs of verification.
Key to solving the principal’s problem is that incentive constraints are tractable. Each
agent wants to send the report that maximizes the probability that his preferred decision
is implemented. We show that if there is a profitable deviation for some type, any type
that has a lower equilibrium probability of getting his preferred outcome also finds this
deviation profitable. This suggests that incentive constraints are hardest to satisfy for the
types that have the lowest equilibrium probability of getting their preferred decision; we
call these types the worst-off types.1 It follows that a mechanism is incentive compatible
if and only if it is incentive compatible for the worst-off types.
We can now explain how and why the optimal mechanism differs from the first best
outcome. First, in the optimal mechanism the principal incurs costs of verification. Veri-
fications are clearly necessary if information is private and, since the incentive constraints
for worst-off types are exactly binding, the optimal mechanism uses costly verifications
as rarely as possible. Second, the decision is distorted compared to the first-best because
there is bunching at the bottom. This is optimal for the principal because, as observed
above, incentive constraints are hardest to satisfy for worst-off types. Suppose instead
there was no bunching at the bottom and a single type had the lowest probability of
getting the preferred decision. Then any higher report has to be verified sometimes to
make the worst-off type indifferent between reporting truthfully and deviating. Now if we
increase the probability that the worst-off type gets his preferred outcome this will only
change the decision for this type, which has essentially no effect on the principal’s ex-
pected utility from the decision. But this makes it less attractive for the worst-off type to
claim to be of a different type and the principal can, therefore, verify all other types with
a strictly lower probability. Thus, this change allows the principal to save on verification
costs for almost all reports but it only changes the decision for one type. This implies that
the cost-saving effect dominates. We conclude that the original mechanism, with a single
worst-off type, could not have been optimal and that the optimal mechanism must feature
bunching at the bottom. Finally, the principal’s first-best decision would be to implement
the new policy whenever the sum of types is positive, but in the optimal mechanism the
principal uses net types instead to determine the decision, which introduces a further
1Since we allow for general utility functions, these are not necessarily the types with the lowest
expected utility.
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distortion. Whenever an agent’s report ti is verified, the principal pays the verification
cost ci. If the principal implements the new policy because agent i reported a high type,
i’s effect on the principal’s payoff is only his net value ti ´ ci and not his actual type ti
because the principal has to pay the verification cost ci. It is, therefore, optimal for the
principal to distort the decision rule by using net types instead of true types.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing relevant literature,
we present in Section 2 our main model and describe the principal’s objective. In Section 3,
we discuss the optimal mechanism, and in Section 4 we prove an equivalence between
Bayesian and ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms. We consider various extensions
in Section 5, including an analysis of the optimal mechanism with imperfect verification.
All proofs not found in the main body of the paper are relegated to the Appendix.
Related Literature
There is a substantial literature on collective choice problems with two alternatives when
monetary transfers are not possible. A particular strand of this literature, dating back
to the seminal work of Rae (1969), assumes that agents have cardinal utilities and com-
pares decision rules with respect to ex-ante expected utilities. Because money cannot
be used to elicit cardinal preferences, Pareto-optimal decision rules are simple and can
be implemented as voting rules, where agents indicate only whether they are in favor of
or against the policy (Schmitz and Tro¨ger 2012, Azreli and Kim 2014). Introducing a
technology to learn the agents’ information allows a much richer class of decision rules to
be implemented. Our main interest lies in understanding how this additional possibility
allows for other implementable mechanisms and changes the optimal decision rule.
Townsend (1979) introduces costly verification in a principal-agent model with a risk-
averse agent. Our model differs from his, and the literature building on it (see e. g. Gale
and Hellwig 1985, Border and Sobel 1987), since monetary transfers are not feasible in
our model. Allowing for monetary transfers yields different incentive constraints and
economic trade-offs than in a model without money.
Recently, there has been growing interest in models with state verification that do
not allow for transfers. Ben-Porath, Dekel and Lipman (2014, henceforth BDL) consider
a principal that wishes to allocate an indivisible good among a group of agents, and
each agent’s type can be learned at a given cost. The principal’s trade-off is between
allocating the object efficiently and incurring the cost of verification. BDL characterize
the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal: it is a favored-agent
mechanism, where a pre-determined favored agent receives the object unless another agent
claims a value above a threshold, in which case the agent with the highest (net) type
gets the object. We study a similar model of costly verification and without transfers,
but we are interested in optimal mechanisms in collective choice problems. In these
problems more complex voting mechanisms are feasible, even in the absence of verification
possibilities. More recently, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2017) study the allocation of
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an indivisible good when the principal always learns the private information of the agents
but only after having made the allocation decision and having only limited penalties at
his disposal. Halac and Yared (2017) introduce costly verification in a delegation setting
and describe the conditions under which interval delegation with an “escape clause” is
optimal.
Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) and Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) consider a situation
in which an agent has private information about several characteristics and tries to per-
suade a principal to take a given action, and the principal can only check one of the
agent’s characteristics. Recently, Ben-Porath, Dekel and Lipman (2019) study a class of
mechanism design problems with evidence. They show that the optimal mechanism does
not use randomization, commitment is not an issue, and robust incentive compatibility
does not entail any cost. Additionally, they show that costly verification models can be
embedded as evidence games as an alternative way of finding optimal mechanisms, but
the results on commitment and robustness does not apply to costly verification models.2
2 Model and Preliminaries
There is a principal and a set of agents I “ t1, 2, . . . , Iu. The principal decides between
implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo.3 Each agent holds private
information, summarized by his type ti P R. The payoff to the principal is
ř
i ti if the new
policy is implemented, and it is normalized to zero if the status quo remains. Monetary
transfers are not possible. The private information held by the agents is verifiable. The
principal can check agent i at a cost of ci, in which case he learns the true type of agent
i. Being verified imposes no costs on the agent. Agent i with type ti obtains a utility
of uiptiq if the policy is implemented and zero otherwise. For example, if uiptiq “ ti for
each agent, the principal maximizes utilitarian welfare; in general, the principal could
have divergent preferences, for example, because he only cares about how the new policy
affects himself.4 Types are drawn independently from the type space Ti Ă R according
to the distribution function Fi with finite moments and density fi. Let t ” ptiqiPI and
T ”
ś
i Ti.
The principal can design a mechanism and agents play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in the game induced by the mechanism. A mechanism could potentially be an indirect
and complicated dynamic mechanism that includes multiple rounds of communication
and checking. However, we show in Appendix A.1 that it is without loss of generality to
focus on direct mechanisms with truth-telling as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. To allow
2For additional papers on mechanism design with evidence, see also Green and Laffont (1986), Bull
and Watson (2007), Deneckere and Severinov (2008), Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012).
3We discuss in Section 5 how our analysis changes if the principal can decide between more than two
actions.
4Another interpretation of the objective function, suggested by a referee, is that the principal is
interested in the mean of an unknown parameter.
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for stochastic mechanisms we introduce a correlation device as a tool to correlate the
decision rule with the verification rules. Assume that s is a random variable that is drawn
independently of the types from a uniform distribution on r0, 1s, and only observed by the
principal. A direct mechanism pd, a, ℓq consists of a decision rule d : T ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u,
a profile of verification rules a ” paiqiPI , where ai : T ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u, and a profile
of penalty rules ℓ ” pℓiqiPI , where ℓi : T ˆ Ti ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u. In a direct mechanism
pd, a, ℓq, each agent sends a message mi P Ti to the principal. Given these messages the
principal verifies agent i if aipm, sq “ 1. If no one is found to have lied, the principal
implements the new policy if dpm, sq “ 1.5 If the verification reveals that agent i has
lied, the new policy is implemented if and only if ℓipm, ti, sq “ 1, where ti is agent i’s
true type. If more than one agent lied it is arbitrary what decision to take. For each
agent i, let T`i :“ tti P Ti|uiptiq ą 0u denote the set of types that are in favor of the
new policy, and let T´i :“ tti P Ti|uiptiq ă 0u denote the set of types that are against the
policy. We assume that t´i ă t
`
i for all t
´
i P T
´
i and t
`
i P T
`
i . This assumption ensures
a weak alignment between the agents’ and the principal’s preferences: if an agent is in
favor of the new policy this increases the principal’s expected utility from implementing
the policy. This implies that no agent has an incentive to misrepresent his ordinal type,
for example by claiming that he is in favor of the new policy while he actually is against
the new policy. To simplify notation, we also assume that no agent is indifferent, so
Ti “ T
`
i Y T
´
i .
Example 1. To illustrate a situation in which the general utility function uiptiq is useful,
consider a principal deciding whether to provide a public good. Agents are privately
informed about their value for the public good, which is always positive. The principal
bears the cost k of providing the public good and maximizes the sum of the agents’ values
minus the potential cost of providing the public good.
This example can be mapped into our model by defining the type of an agent that
values the public good at vi to be ti “ vi ´ k{I, and by setting uiptiq ą 0 for all ti.
Clearly, all agents are in favor, even if their types are negative, and the principal’s payoff
of providing the public good is
ř
ti “
ř
vi ´ k.
Truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the mechanism pd, a, ℓq if and only
if the mechanism pd, a, ℓq is Bayesian incentive compatible, which is formally defined as
follows.
Definition 1. A mechanism pd, a, ℓq is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if, for all
i P I and all ti, t
1
i P Ti,
uiptiq ¨ Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqs ě uiptiq ¨ Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqr1´ aipt
1
i, t´i, sqs ` aipt
1
i, t´i, sqℓipt
1
i, t, sqs.
5With slight abuse of notation, we will drop the realization of the randomization device as an argu-
ment whenever the correlation is irrelevant. In these cases, Esrdpm, sqs is simply denoted as dpmq and
Esraipm, sqs is denoted as aipmq.
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The left-hand side of the equation in Definition 1 is the interim expected utility if
agent i truthfully reports his type ti and all others also report truthfully. The right-hand
side is the interim expected utility if agent i instead lies and reports to be of type t1i.
The aim of the principal is to find an incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes
his expected utility. The expected utility of the principal for a given mechanism pd, a, ℓq
is
Et
”ÿ
i
pdptqti ´ aiptqciq
ı
,
where expectations are taken over the prior distribution of types.
Because the principal uses an incentive compatible mechanism, lies will occur only
off the equilibrium path and will therefore not directly enter the objective function. The
principal can therefore always choose the severest possible penalty for a lying agent.
This will not affect the outcome on the equilibrium path, but it weakens the incentive
constraints. For example, if an agent is found to have lied and his true type supports the
new policy, the penalty will be to maintain the status quo. Henceforth, without loss of
optimality, we assume that the principal uses this penalty scheme and, we will drop the
reference to a profile of penalty functions when we describe a mechanism.
At this point, we have all the prerequisites and definitions required to formally state
the aim of the principal:
max
d,a
Et
”ÿ
i
pdptqti ´ aiptqciq
ı
(P)
s.t. pd, aq is Bayesian incentive compatible.
The following lemma provides a characterization of Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanisms.
Lemma 1. A mechanism pd, aq is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if, for all
i P I and all ti P Ti,
inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ě Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqr1´ aipti, t´i, sqss and
sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ď Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqr1´ aipti, t´i, sqs ` aipti, t´i, sqs.
We call a type a worst-off type if the infimum (respectively the supremum) in Lemma 1 is
attained for this type. The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows: first, because of the binary
nature of the principal’s decision an agent maximizes his utility by sending a report that
maximizes the probability of getting the preferred decision. Now if type ti can increase
this probability by deviating to a report t1i, any other type can use the same deviation t
1
i
to get the same probability (since types are distributed independently). By construction
worst-off types have the lowest probability of getting their preferred decision when being
truthful. Thus, whenever some type has a profitable deviation so does the worst-off types.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Let i P I. We will consider two cases, one when agent i is in favor of
the policy (t1i P T
`
i ), and the other case is when agent i is against the policy (t
1
i P T
´
i ).
Since uiptiq ą 0 for ti P T
`
i and we can without loss of generality set ℓipt
1, ti, sq “ 0
for all t1 and ti P T
`
i , we get that agent i with type t
1
i P T
`
i has no incentive to deviate if
and only if, for all ti P Ti,
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ě Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqr1´ aipti, t´i, sqss. (1)
Since (1) is required to hold for all t1i P T
`
i , it must in particular hold for the infimum
over T`i , which is equivalent to Definition 1 of BIC.
Similarly, since uiptiq ă 0 for ti P T
´
i and we can without loss of generality set
ℓipt
1, ti, sq “ 1 for all t
1 and ti P T
´
i , a type t
1
i P T
´
i , has no incentive to deviate if and only
if, for all ti P Ti,
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ď Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqr1´ aipti, t´i, sqs ` aipti, t´i, sqs. (2)
Since (2) is required to hold for all t1i P T
´
i , it must in particular hold for the supremum
over T´i , which is equivalent to Definition 1 of BIC.
3 Voting-with-evidence
In this section, we show that a voting-with-evidence mechanism is optimal, find optimal
weights in a setting with two agents, and discuss comparative statics.
3.1 Optimal mechanism
To formally define a voting-with-evidence mechanism, we define, given a collection of
weights tω`i , ω
´
i uiPI satisfying ω
´
i ď ω
`
i , the weight function wi : Ti Ñ R by
wiptiq “
$’’’’’&
’’’’’%
ω`i if ti ď ω
`
i ` ci
ω´i if ti ě ω
´
i ´ ci
ti ´ ci if ti ą ω
`
i ` ci
ti ` ci if ti ă ω
´
i ´ ci.
Given the weight functions wi, we say that a mechanism is a voting-with-evidence mech-
anism if
dptq “
#
1 if
ř
wiptiq ą 0
0 if
ř
wiptiq ă 0
and an agent i is verified if and only if he is decisive. An agent i is decisive at a profile
of reports t if his preferred outcome is implemented and if the decision were to change if
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ti
wi uiptiq “ ti
ω`i
ω´i
ω´i ´ ci ω
`
i ` ci
T`iT
´
i
Figure 2: Example illustrating how weights are determined with utility uiptiq “ ti.
his report was replaced by his relevant cutoff (ω`i ` ci if he is in favor and ω
´
i ´ ci if he
prefers status quo).
A voting-with-evidence mechanism can be interpreted as a cardinal voting rule, where
agents have the option to make specific claims to gain additional influence. To see this,
consider the following indirect mechanism. Each agent casts a vote either in favor of or
against the new policy. In addition, agents can make claims about their information. If
agent i does not make such a claim, his vote is weighted by the baseline weights ω`i if he
votes in favor of and ´ω´i if he votes against the new policy. If agent i supports the new
policy and makes a claim ti, his weight is increased to ti ´ ci. Similarly, if he opposes the
new policy, his weight is increased to ´ti ` ci. The new policy is implemented whenever
the sum of weighted votes in favor are larger than the sum of the weighted votes against
the new policy. An agent’s claim will be checked whenever he is decisive. This indirect
mechanism indeed implements the same outcome as a voting-with-evidence mechanism.
Any agents with weak or no information supporting their desired alternative will prefer to
merely cast a vote, whereas agents with sufficiently strong information will make claims
to gain additional influence over the outcome of the principal’s decision. Note that the
cutoffs already determine the default voting rule that is used if all agents cast votes.
A voting-with-evidence mechanism is particularly simple to describe when all agents
have type-independent preferences, i.e., for each i, uiptiq ą 0 or uiptiq ă 0 for all ti. For
instance, consider the case of deciding on the provision of a public good, where the cost
of provision of the public good is borne by the principal (this case is spelled out in detail
in Example 1). Therefore, when agent i is always in favor of implementing the project,
agent i is assigned a default type of ω`i ` ci, and the principal presumes i has the default
type unless i reports differently. The principal reduces the reported (or presumed) type
by the verification cost to obtain i’s net type, and implements the policy whenever the
sum of net types is positive. If an agent changes the outcome because he reports a type
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different from the default type, he will be verified.
Remark 1 (Ex-post incentive compatibility of voting-with-evidence mechanisms). We
will now show that a voting-with-evidence mechanism is incentive compatible. We will
do so by showing that for every type realization truth-telling is a best response. Let t P T
be a profile of types, consider an agent i with type ti, and assume that agent i is in favor
of the new policy, i.e., ti P T
`
i . If dpti, t´iq “ 1, then agent i gets his preferred alternative,
and there is no beneficial deviation. Suppose instead that dpti, t´iq “ 0; then, agent i
can only change the decision by reporting some t1i ą ti and t
1
i ą ω
`
i ` ci. However, if
dpt1i, t´iq “ 1, then agent i is decisive and will be verified. Agent i’s true type ti will be
revealed and the penalty is the retention of the status quo. Thus, agent i cannot gain
by deviating to t1i. A symmetric argument holds if agent i is against the new policy, i.e.,
ti P T
´
i . These arguments imply that truth-telling is an optimal response to truth-telling
for every type realization and therefore independently of the beliefs the agents hold. We
conclude that a voting-with-evidence mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1. A voting-with-evidence mechanism maximizes the expected utility of the
principal.
Appendix A.2 contains the proof of Theorem 1. We first prove it for finite type spaces,
and then extend the proof to infinite type spaces through an approximation argument.
Before finding optimal weights for a voting-with-evidence mechanism in a two-agent ex-
ample, we will explain intuitively why these mechanisms are optimal.
A voting-with-evidence mechanism differs in three respects from the first-best mecha-
nism. We will argue that these inefficiencies have to be present in an optimal mechanism
and that any additional inefficiencies will make the principal worse off. First, the principal
verifies all decisive agents and incurs the corresponding costs, which he would not need
to do if the information were public. Clearly, sometimes verifying agents is necessary to
satisfy the incentive constraints for the given decision rule. Moreover, in a voting-with-
evidence mechanism the verification rules are chosen such that the incentive constraints
are in fact binding: if the principal were to reduce the audit probability for some report,
types in the bunching region would have a strict incentive to send this report. Thus, the
principal cannot implement the given decision rule with lower verification costs.
The second inefficiency is introduced by replacing types with net types. Specifically,
any report ti P T
`
i and above ω
`
i ` ci is replaced by the net type ti ´ ci. Similarly, types
ti P T
´
i and below ω
´
i ´ ci are replaced by the net type ti ` ci. Suppose we replace types
of agent i by net types. Then, for a given profile of types, by replacing agent i’s type
with his net type, the decision will either remain the same or it will change. First, if
the decision remains the same it does not matter whether the type or net type is used.
On the other hand, if the decision changes then agent i must be decisive with type ti,
but not with the net type. Therefore, the principal has to verify the agent if he uses the
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type ti to decide on the policy in order to induce truthful reporting and incurs the cost of
verification. Hence, the actual contribution of agent i to the principal’s utility is his net
type, ti´ ci, and not ti. Thus, the principal is made better off by using i’s net type ti´ ci
when determining his decision on the policy, anticipating that he will have to verify the
agent whenever he is decisive.
The third inefficiency arises from the fact that all types below the cutoff ω`i ` ci of
an agent in favor of the policy are bunched together and receive the same weight, the
baseline weight ω`i . Similarly, all types above the cutoff ω
´
i ´ ci and against the policy
are bunched together into the baseline weight ω´i . Suppose instead that in the optimal
mechanism there was a type t1i P T
`
i that uniquely had the lowest probability of getting
his preferred decision, Erdpt1i, t´iqs ă Erdpti, t´iqs for all ti. Increasing the probability
with which this type gets his most preferred alternative does not affect the principal’s
expected utility directly (because this type is realized with probability 0). However, our
characterization of incentive compatibility implies that changing this probability affects
the audit probability for all other types ti P T
`
i :
Et´irapti, t´iqs ě Et´irdpti, t´iqs ´ Et´irdpt
1
i, t´iqs.
Therefore, changing the allocation on a Null set will allow the principal to save verification
costs with strictly positive probability. This contradicts that the original mechanism could
be optimal and implies that any optimal mechanism will have bunching “at the bottom”.6
Remark 2. We comment briefly on the role of the assumption t´i ă t
`
i for all t
´
i P T
´
i
and t`i P T
`
i . Without this assumption we get a similar result to Theorem 1 except for
the conclusion ω`i ě ω
´
i . We then have to check whether agents have an incentive to
misreport their ordinal preference in this mechanism. As long as ω`i ě ω
´
i all incentive
constraints are satisfied even if the assumption t´i ă t
`
i is violated. Only if preferences
are strongly misaligned, so that an agent being in favor makes the principal less eager
to implement the new policy, we have to augment the mechanism by either (i) verifying
agents even if they report in the bunching region or (ii) adjusting the weights so that
ω`i ě ω
´
i holds.
6More specifically, assume there is an agent i who is always in favor of the new policy, his type space
is Ti “ r0, 1s and suppose Et´irdp0, t´iqs ă Et´irdpti, t´iqs, so 0 is the only worst-off type. In particular,
every report except 0 will sometimes be verified. Consider changing the decision rule so that, for any type
ti P r0, εs and any t´i, the probability of implementing the new policy is d˜pti, t´iq “ Erdpz, t´iq|z ď εs, and
the expected decision is unchanged for all other types of i and all other agents. It then follows from Lemma
1 that for any type above ε the verification probability can be reduced by δ “ Et´ird˜p0, t´iq´dp0, t´iqs ą 0
and no type of agent i below ε will ever be verified. For ε sufficiently small, the saving in verification
costs is in the order of δp1´εq and therefore outweighs the inefficiency induced to the decision rule, which
is in the order of δε. Hence, it could not have been optimal to have a unique worst-off type.
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3.2 Optimal weights and comparative statics for two agents
We will begin with characterizing the optimal weights in an utilitarian setting with two
agents and then discuss comparative statics.7
Proposition 1. Suppose I “ 2, T`i “ tti P Ti|ti ě 0u, and T
´
i “ tti P Ti|ti ă 0u. Let ω
`
i
and ω´i be implicitly defined by
Erti|ti ě 0s “ Ermaxtω
`
i , ti ´ ciu|ti ě 0s and
Erti|ti ă 0s “ Ermintω
´
i , ti ` ciu|ti ă 0s.
Then voting-with-evidence using weights ω`i and ω
´
i is optimal.
To gain some intuition for the result in Proposition 1, suppose ω`1 ą ´ω
´
2 and con-
sider slightly changing ω`1 . This only has an effect if t2 ` c2 “ ´ω
`
1 , so we condition
throughout on this event. If ω`1 is slightly increased, then for any t1 ą 0 the project will
be implemented and no one will be verified. On the other hand, if ω`1 is slightly decreased
there are two cases: if t1 ´ c1 ` t2 ` c2 ě 0 the project is implemented and agent 1 is
verified, otherwise the project is not implemented and agent 2 is verified. We obtain that
ω`1 satisfies the first-order condition ifż 8
0
t1 ` t2dF1pt1q “
ż 8
0
pt1 ` t2 ´ c1q1t1´c1`t2`c2ě0pt1q ´ c21t1´c1`t2`c2ă0pt2qdF1pt1q.
Using t2 ` c2 “ ´ω
`
1 , this can be rewritten asż 8
0
t1dF1pt1q “
ż 8
0
pt1 ´ c1q1t1´c1ěω`1 pt1q ` ω
`
1
1t1´c1ăω`1
pt2qdF1pt1q,
which yields the first condition in Proposition 1. An analgous argument heuristically
explains the second condition.
Given the characterization of the optimal weights in Proposition 1, we can study
how a change in the cost parameter ci affects the optimal weights. Suppose that the
cost of verifying agent i increases. Then the optimal weight ω`i will increase in order for
Erti|ti ě 0s to equal Ermaxtω
`
i , ti´ciu|ti ě 0s. Analogously, the increase in ci implies that
ω´i decreases. We conclude that, as the cost of verifying an agent increases, the bunching
region increases and the agent will be verified less often. Another possible comparative
static result concerns a second-order stochastic dominance change. Suppose the expected
value of agent i’s type ti, conditional on him being in favor, increases. Then Proposition
1 implies that his optimal weight ω`i increases as well.
7With more than two agents, the weight of agent i not only affects the likelihood that i is decisive, but
also has non-trivial effects on the probability that other agents are decisive. It is therefore more difficult
to find closed-form solutions for the optimal weights ω`
i
, ω´
i
.
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4 BIC-EPIC equivalence
A voting-with-evidence mechanism is not only Bayesian incentive compatible, but it also
satisfies the stronger notion of ex-post incentive compatibility (see Remark 1). This ro-
bustness of the voting-with-evidence mechanism is a desirable property of any mechanism
that one wish to use in real-life applications because optimal strategies are independent
of beliefs and information structure. Reducing the number of assumptions about common
knowledge and weakening the informational requirements places the theoretical analysis
underpinning the design on firmer ground (Wilson (1987) and Bergemann and Morris
(2005)).
Because the optimal mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible we conclude that the
principal cannot gain by weakening the incentive constraints. A natural question to
ask is why the principal cannot save on verification costs by implementing the optimal
mechanism in Bayesian equilibrium instead of ex-post equilibrium. We show that the
answer lies in a general equivalence between Bayesian and ex-post incentive compatible
mechanisms. For every BIC mechanism, there exists an ex-post incentive compatible
mechanism that induces the same interim expected decision and verification rules; since
the interim expected decision and verification rules determine the expected utility of the
principal, this implies that an ex-post incentive compatible mechanism is optimal within
the whole class of BIC mechanisms.
Recall that a mechanism pd, aq is BIC if and only if, for all i and ti,
inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ě Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqr1´ aipti, t´i, sqss and (3)
sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ď Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqr1´ aipti, t´i, sqs ` aipti, t´i, sqs. (4)
Analogously, a mechanism pd, aq is ex-post incentive compatible (EPIC) if and only if,
for all i, ti and t´i,
inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Esrdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ě Esrdpti, t´i, sqr1´ aipti, t´i, sqss and (5)
sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Esrdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ď Esrdpti, t´i, sqr1´ aipti, t´i, sqs ` aipti, t´i, sqs. (6)
Not every BIC mechanism is EPIC. More important, not every decision rule that can
be implemented in a Bayesian equilibrium can be implemented in an ex-post equilibrium
with the same verification costs, as the following example illustrates.
Example 2. Suppose that I “ t1, 2u and that agent 2 is always in favor of the new
policy. Each type profile is equally likely and the decision rule d is shown in Figure 3a.
The shaded areas indicate type profiles that induce the lowest probabilities of accepting
the new policy for agent 2. We focus on incentive constraints for agent 2.
Lemma 1 shows that it is sufficient to ensure incentive compatibility for the “worst-
off” types, which are the intermediate types in this example. Since the intermediate
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(a) Decision rule d and its
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that are necessary for EPIC.
Figure 3: Failure of a naive BIC-EPIC equivalence.
types are the worst-off, they never need to be verified. If high (low) types are verified
with probability 0.2 (0.6), then the Bayesian incentive constraints for the worst-off types
are exactly binding. If we instead want to implement the decision rule d in an ex-post
equilibrium, the cost of verification increases. For example, intermediate types must be
verified with probability 0.5 if agent 1’s type is high. In expectation, agent 2 must be
verified with probability 0.5
3
if he has an intermediate type, with probability 1.1
3
if he has
a high type, and with probability 2.3
3
if he has a low type (the verification probabilities
for each profile of reports are given in Figure 3b).
As Example 2 above illustrates, we cannot simply take a BIC mechanism, maintain the
same decision rule, and expect that the mechanism will also be EPIC without increasing
the verification costs. This is in line what should be expected since for a mechanism to
be EPIC, incentive constraints must hold pointwise and not only in expectation. The
reason for this is that in general the left-hand side of (3) is greater than the expected
value of the left-hand side of (5); that is, inft1
i
PT`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs is generally larger than
Et´i
“
inft1
i
PT`
i
Esrdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs
‰
. A decision rule can be implemented in ex-post equilibrium
at the same costs as in Bayesian equilibrium if and only if the expectation operator
commutes with the infimum/supremum operator, which is a strong requirement. However,
it turns out that for every function, there exists another function that induces the same
marginals and for which the expectation operator commutes with the infimum/supremum
operator. We will use this result to establish an equivalence between BIC and EPIC
mechanisms.
Theorem 2. Let A “
Ś
iAi Ď R
I , let ti be independently distributed with an absolutely
continuous distribution function Fi, and let g : A Ñ r0, 1s be a measurable function.
Then there exists a function gˆ : A Ñ r0, 1s with the same marginals, i. e., for all i,
15
Et´irgp¨, t´iqs “ Et´irgˆp¨, t´iqs almost everywhere, such that for all B Ď Ai,
inf
tiPB
Et´irgˆpti, t´iqs “ Et´ir inf
tiPB
gˆpti, t´iqs and
sup
tiPB
Et´irgˆpti, t´iqs “ Et´irsup
tiPB
gˆpti, t´iqs.
We will illustrate the idea behind the proof of Theorem 2 by assuming that A is finite.
The argument in our proof uses Theorem 6 in Gutmann, Kemperman, Reeds and Shepp
(1991). This theorem shows that for any matrix with elements between 0 and 1 and
with increasing row and column sums, there exists another matrix consisting of elements
between 0 and 1 with the same row and column sums, and whose elements are increasing
in each row and column. To use this result, we reorder A such that the marginals of
g are weakly increasing. Then, Theorem 6 in Gutmann et al. (1991) implies that there
exists a function gˆ that induces the same marginals and is pointwise increasing. For this
function, there is an argument ti for each i that independent of t´i minimizes gˆp¨, t´iq.
This implies that the expectation operator commutes with the infimum operator, i.e.,
Et´irinftiPA gˆpti, t´iqs “ inftiPA Et´irgˆpti, t´iqs. This basic idea sketched above is extended
via an approximation argument to a complete proof in Appendix A.3.
Building on Theorem 2, we can establish an equivalence between BIC and EPIC mech-
anisms. To define this equivalence formally, we call Et´irdpti, t´iqs the interim decision
rule and Et´iraipti, t´iqs the interim verification rules of a mechanism pd, aq.
Definition 2. Two mechanisms pd, aq and pdˆ, aˆq are equivalent if they induce the same
interim decision and verification rules almost everywhere.
Now we can state the equivalence between BIC and EPIC mechanisms.
Theorem 3. For any BIC mechanism pd, aq, there exists an equivalent EPIC mechanism
pdˆ, aˆq.
There are two steps in the construction of an equivalent EPIC mechanism pdˆ, aˆq. In
the first step, we use Theorem 2 to obtain a decision rule dˆ with the same interim decisions
as d and such that for dˆ the expectation operator commutes with the infimum/supremum.
This implies that the left-hand sides of (3) and (4), respectively are equal to the expected
values of the left-hand sides of (5) and (6), respectively. In the second step, we construct
a verification rule aˆ such that all incentive constraints hold as equalities for pdˆ, aˆq. By
potentially adding some verification, we obtain a verification rule aˆ with the same interim
verification rule as a. Thus, we have constructed an equivalent EPIC mechanism pdˆ, aˆq
from the BIC mechanism pd, aq.
Example 2. [ctd] Figure 4b depicts the decision rule dˆ, which has the same marginals as d.
Note that intermediate types of agent 2 always induce the lowest probability of accepting
the proposal, independent of the type of agent 1. This implies that the expected value of
the infimum equals the infimum of the expected value, that is,
inf
t2
Et1rdˆptqs “ Et1rinft2
dˆptqs.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the BIC-EPIC equivalence.
Figure 4b shows a verification rule aˆ such that pdˆ, aˆq is EPIC. The expected verification
probabilities are the same as those necessary for implementation in Bayesian equilibrium.
The economic mechanisms behind our equivalence are different from those underlying
the BIC-DIC equivalence in a standard social choice setting with transfers (with linear
utilities and one-dimensional, private types (Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu and
Shi 2013)). In the standard setting, an allocation rule can be implemented with appro-
priate transfers in Bayesian equilibrium if and only if its marginals are increasing and in
dominant strategies if and only if it is pointwise increasing. In contrast, monotonicity is
neither necessary nor sufficient for implementability in our model.
Note that there is no equivalence between Bayesian and dominant-strategy incentive
compatible mechanisms in our setting, as the following example illustrates. The lack of
private goods to punish agents if there are multiple deviators implies that agents care
whether the other agents are truthful.
Example 3. Suppose that I “ t1, 2, 3u, verification costs are 0 for each agent, and
T`i “ tti|ti ě 0u and T
´
i “ tti|ti ă 0u. Consider the voting-with-evidence mechanism
with cutoffs ω`i ` ci “ 1 and ω
´
i ´ ci “ ´1 for all i. Let t “ p´5, 2, 2q. Given truthful
reporting, the voting-with-evidence mechanism specifies that dptq “ 0. Suppose that
agent 2 deviates from truth-telling and instead reports being of type t1
2
“ 6. Now he
is decisive, and the principal verifies him. After observing the true types p´5, 2, 2q, the
principal has to punish the lie by agent 2 and maintain the status quo to induce truthful
reporting. However, this creates an incentive for agent 3 to misreport. He could report
t13 “ 6, and then no agent is decisive; hence, no one is verified, and the voting-with-
evidence mechanism specifies that dpt1, t
1
2
, t1
3
q “ 1. The voting-with-evidence mechanism
is therefore not dominant-strategy incentive compatible, no matter how we specify the
mechanism off-equilibrium.
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The equivalence between Bayesian and ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms can
be established in other models without money but with verification. We believe that the
tools we used in this paper can prove useful in similar settings with verification. In fact,
we can use arguments paralleling those used to prove Theorem 2 (but using Theorem 1 in
Gershkov et al. (2013) instead of the result by Gutmann et al. (1991)) to show that there
is an equivalence of Bayesian and dominant-strategy incentive compatible mechanisms in
BDL.
5 Imperfect Verification and Robustness
In this section we discuss the robustness of our results from various angles. In the first
part, we relax the assumption of perfect verification. In the second part, we discuss briefly
type-dependent costs of verification, interdependent preferences, a continuous decision on
the level of the public good, and limited commitment.
5.1 Imperfect verification
Thus far, we have assumed that the verification technology works perfectly, that is, when-
ever the principal audits an agent, he will learn the true type with probability one. We
now explore the extent to which the above results are robust to imperfect verification.
We will study a reduced form model and assume that in the event of an audit of agent i,
the verification technology reveals the true type of agent i only with probability p, and
with probability 1 ´ p, the technology fails, in which case the output of the technology
equals the report by the agent. Consequently, if the verification output differs from the
reported type the principal knows that the agent lied. However, if the output of the
verification technology coincides with the reported type the principal only knows that the
agent was truthful or that the verification technology failed, but not which of these two
cases applies. Moreover, we assume that multiple verifications of the same agent reveal
no additional information.
To find the optimal mechanism we first characterize Bayesian incentive compatibility
in this new setting with imperfect verification. Similar to the case of perfect verification
the key incentive constraints are those for the worst-off types. The additional uncertainty
of whether the verification technology managed to detect a lie implies that the worst-off
type must get a higher expected probability of getting the preferred alternative.
Lemma 2. A mechanism pd, aq is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if, for all
i P I and all ti P Ti,
inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ě Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqr1´ p ¨ aipti, t´i, sqss
sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ď Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqr1´ p ¨ aipti, t´i, sqs ` p ¨ aipti, t´i, sqs.
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Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1.
The imperfectness of the verification technology implies that it is harder to satisfy the
incentive constraints. Moreover, there is an upper bound on how much influence an agent
can have in expectation. Since, by feasibility aipt, sq ď 1 and using Lemma 2 we get that
any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism satisfies
@ti P T
`
i : Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqs ď
1
1´ p
inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs (7)
@ti P T
´
i : Et´i,srdpti, t´i, sqs ě
1
1´ p
«
sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ´ p
ff
. (8)
This adds an additional constraint to the relaxed problem that essentially restricts the
maximal influence an agent could have on the decision rule in any incentive compatible
mechanism. The higher the probability of failure 1´ p of the verification technology the
tighter the bound is and the less influence an agent can have.
ti
wi uiptiq “ ti
ν´i
ν`i
ω´i
ω`i
T`iT
´
i
Figure 5: Example illustrating weights for imperfect verification with utility uiptiq “ ti.
Theorem 4. With imperfect verification as described above, an optimal mechanism sets
dptq “ 1 if and only if
ř
i wiptiq ą 0, where
wiptiq “
$’’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’’%
ω`i if ti P T
`
i and ti ď ω
`
i `
ci
p
ω´i if ti P T
´
i and ti ě ω
´
i ´
ci
p
ti ´
ci
p
if ti P T
`
i and ν
`
i ą ti ´
ci
p
ą ω`i
ti `
ci
p
if ti P T
´
i and ν
´
i ă ti `
ci
p
ă ω´i
ν`i if ti P T
`
i and ti ě ν
`
i `
ci
p
ν´i if ti P T
´
i and ti ď ν
´
i ´
ci
p
for some constants tω`i , ω
´
i , ν
`
i , ν
´
i u satisfying ω
´
i ď ω
`
i .
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Compared to the optimal mechanism in the benchmark model with perfect verification,
the optimal mechanism with imperfect verification can feature additional bunching regions
at the extremes (see Figure 5). The reason is that any incentive compatible mechanism
must restrict the maximal weight of an agent compared to the worst-off types. If a
worst-off type could misreport his type and thereby increase the probability of getting
his preferred outcome by too much, this misreport would be a profitable deviation even if
this agent was always verified, simply because the verification technology sometimes fails
to detect the lie. Therefore, any incentive compatible mechanism must cap the maximal
weight an agent could get, inducing bunching for the extreme types.8
In contrast to the optimal mechanism with perfect verification it is not enough to only
verify decisive agents. Clearly, one should only verify an agent that gets his preferred
outcome, but to induce truth-telling as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium one sometimes needs to
verify agents who are not decisive. Suppose only decisive agents were verified. Clearly,
agents with worst-off types would have an incentive to overstate their types because this
could never hurt them (they are only verified if they are decisive, in which case the penalty
is the outcome they would have obtained under truth-telling), and benefits them whenever
the verification technology fails to detect their lie. Thus, agents sometimes need to be
verified even so they are not decisive; by doing this sufficiently often we can ensure that
the mechanism is BIC. There are several ex-post auditing rules that can make the optimal
mechanism BIC, and we have not specified exactly which agents are going to be verified
for a given realization of reports. We establish the existence of a feasible auditing rule in
Lemma 8. This reasoning also implies that the optimal mechanism is not ex-post incentive
compatible if the verification technology is imperfect.
Remark 3. The additional bunching regions are the main qualitative difference of the
optimal decision rule compared to the model with perfect verification. However, in many
settings this difference will not even arise: if an optimal decision rule d (as described in
Theorem 4) satisfies, for each i,
p1´ pq sup
tiPT
`
i
Et´idpti, t´iq ă inf
tiPT
`
i
Et´idpti, t´iq and
p1´ pq inf
tiPT
´
i
Et´idpti, t´iq ą sup
tiPT
´
i
Et´idpti, t´iq,
then ν`i “ 8 and ν
´
i “ ´8 (see the proof of Lemma 7). Therefore, the weight func-
tion looks qualitatively as in the case of perfect verification. For example, if p ą 1
2
then the above conditions are always satisfied for a symmetric mechanism (d is symmet-
ric around 0) in a symmetric environment (fiptiq “ fip´tiq and T
`
i “ ´T
´
i ), because
inftiPT`i
Et´idpti, t´iq ě
1
2
and suptiPT´i
Et´idpti, t´iq ď
1
2
.
8This is reminiscent of the optimal mechanism in Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2017), who study the
optimal allocation of a prize when the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim.
In their model, the limit on the penalty similarly requires that agents with the highest possible type are
merely short-listed and will not win the prize with certainty.
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5.2 Robustness
In the remainder we are going to keep the assumption of perfect verification and change
some of our other assumptions to inquire which features of our analysis are robust.
Type-dependent cost function In our benchmark model we assume that the cost of
verifying an agent only depends on the agent’s identity and not on his true type. Alter-
natively, one could argue that it’s more expensive to audit an agent that claims to have a
large type and provides extensive documentation substantiating his claim. Similarly, one
could argue that it is easier, and therefore cheaper, to verify an agent with a low type.
Here, we explain how our conclusions are altered if we allow for the audit cost to depend
on the true type. Let ciptiq denote the audit cost for verifying agent i if his true type is
ti.
We observe first that the revelation principle still applies, and we can restrict attention
to Bayesian incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Also, this change only affects the
principal’s utility and we can therefore use the characterization of Bayesian incentive
compatibility as before. On the equilibrium path, the principal will only verify agents
that are truthful, so the cost of verification is ciptiq. To simplify the discussion, we
assume that the net type ti ´ ciptiq is increasing in ti.
9 Using the same arguments as in
our benchmark model we can conclude that the optimal mechanism uses a weighting rule
as in a voting-with-evidence mechanism, except that the weight of a report outside of the
bunching region is now ti ´ ciptiq instead of ti ´ ci (respectively, ti ` ciptiq). The part
of the weighting function outside the bunching region is therefore no longer a straight
line with a slope of one but a potentially nonlinear increasing function instead. Other
than that the optimal mechanism is like a voting-with-evidence mechanism: the project
is implemented if the sum of the weighted reports is positive and an agent is verified if
and only if he is decisive.
Choosing the level of the public good In our benchmark model we assume the
principal takes a binary action by deciding whether or not to implement a public project.
We relax this assumption here and analyze a principal who decides on the quantity d P
r0, 1s of a public good and assume that the principal pays a cost of Cpdq for providing
the public good at level d. Assume that the cost function C : r0, 1s Ñ R is continuously
differentiable, increasing, convex, and satisfies C 1p0q “ 0 and limdÑ1 Cpdq “ `8. All
agents have preferences of the form upti, dq “ ti ¨ d and ti P r0, 1s, i.e., agents always
prefers more of the public good to less. The objective function of the principal is
Et
“ÿ
i
rdptqti ´ aiptqcis ´ Cpdptqq
‰
(9)
since he incurs the additional costs Cpdq of providing the public good.
9If the net type ti´ ciptiq is not increasing similar arguments can be applied after the types have been
reordered.
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We begin the discussion with the simplest setting of having only one agent. It fol-
lows again from Lemma 1 that any incentive compatible mechanism satisfies inft1 dpt
1q ě
dptqp1´aptqq and, since audits are costly, it is optimal to choose the verification rule such
that this holds as an equality. Plugging this into the objective function, we get that the
principal maximizes Et
“
dptqt´ p1´ inft1 dpt
1q
dptq
qc´ Cpdptqq
‰
.10
The optimal decision rule d must therefore satisfy, for almost every t such that dptq ą
inft1 dpt
1q, the following first-order condition:
t´ c
inft1 dpt
1q
d2ptq
´ C 1pdptqq “ 0. (10)
Therefore, as before there is a bunching region, and outside the bunching region we
have downward-distortions, i.e., too little public good is provided and this distortion
is increasing in the verification cost. Note that in contrast to the previous analysis,
where the quantity was either 0 or 1, optimal audits are now stochastic (as they satisfy
aptq “ 1 ´ inft1 dpt
1q
dptq
). Intuition suggests that these conclusions for one agent carry over
to the case with multiple agents if we impose ex-post incentive compatibility instead of
Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Let us now look briefly at the case with several agents and Bayesian incentive con-
straints. The characterization of Bayesian incentive compatibility in Lemma 1 continues
to hold in this setting. Although incentive constraints remain tractable, solving the prin-
cipal’s problem turns out to be less tractable. The principal’s optimization problem is to
maximize (9) subject to
Et´irdpti, t´iqs ě inf
t1
i
Et´irdpt
1
i, t´iqs ě Et´i
“
dpti, t´iqp1´ aipti, t´iqq
‰
. (11)
Consider first how to construct the optimal audit rule for a given decision rule d. Again,
the optimal audit rule will satisfy the second inequality in (11) as an equality. To achieve
this in the most cost efficient way, we set, for each i and ti, aipti, t´iq “ 1 for those t´i
such that dpti, t´iq is largest until the second inequality in (11) binds. Thus, the optimal
verification rule is deterministic. This is in contrast to the analysis above for the case
of one agent. It also implies that there is no simple way to compute the verification
costs necessary to implement a given decision rule and we cannot formulate the problem
in a simple way with the decision rule being the only choice variable. Because of this,
10Observe that, for an optimal decision rule, inft1 dpt
1q ą 0. Suppose instead inft1 dpt
1q “ 0. Given
ε ą 0, let δpεq “ Probptt|dptq ď εuq. If there is ε ą 0 such that δpεq ă 1, we can change the decision rule
such that inft1 dpt
1q “ ε by only changing the decision for types in tt|dptq ă εu. This change will increase
the cost of public good provision by at most δpεqεC 1pεq, but will decrease the cost of verifications by at
least p1 ´ δpεqqεc. Therefore, for ε small enough this increases the principal’s expected payoff. On the
other hand, if δpεq “ 1 for all ε ą 0 then dptq “ 0 for almost every t. Changing the decision rule to
dptq “ ε increases the cost of public good provision by at most εC 1pεq and increases the expected welfare
of the principal by εErts. Since C is continuously differentiable and C 1p0q “ 0 we can therefore choose ε
small enough such that this change increases the principal’s expected welfare. We conclude that in any
optimal mechanism inft1 dpt
1q ą 0.
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a complete analysis of the optimal decision rule in this case is beyond the scope of our
paper.
Interdependent preferences Independent private values allow for a simple character-
ization of incentive compatibility: a mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible if and
only if it is Bayesian incentive compatible for the worst-off types. This observation does
not carry over to models with interdependent preferences. While a complete analysis of
this case is beyond the scope of this paper, we discuss below the incentives to misreport
in a voting-with-evidence mechanism and possible improvements of this mechanism when
preferences are interdependent. To fix ideas, for each i P I, suppose Ti “ r´1, 1s and
agent i’s utility is given by uiptq “ ti ` α
ř
j‰i tj if the policy is implemented and the
type profile is t, where α satisfies 0 ă α ă 1. For our discussion below consider a fixed
voting-with-evidence mechanism.
If the level of interdependence, α, is high enough then incentive constraints in the
voting-with-evidence mechanism are not binding. Recall that in our benchmark model
reports are verified exactly to make worst-off types indifferent between lying and being
truthful. If preferences are sufficiently interdependent, an agent with a small positive
type might not want to deviate and send a large report even without verifications: his
utility is mainly determined by other agents’ types, and claiming a high type might lead
to implementation of the new policy although all others have negative types. This implies
that one can reduce the verification probability of large reports without creating any
incentives to misreport. However, one cannot lower the verification probability all the
way to zero, as otherwise intermediate types will have an incentive to send high reports.
Which incentive constraints will be binding in the optimal mechanism therefore depends
on the details of preferences and type distributions. This implies that it is difficult to find
the optimal mechanism. But the arguments so far suggest that one way to improve upon
a voting-with-evidence mechanism might be to reduce the verification probabilities for
high reports, at least if α, the degree of preference interdependence, is sufficiently large.
For moderate degrees of interdependence, α, all types above a threshold will prefer
the new policy no matter what the types of all others are since they are only moderately
affected by others’ types. For these types, incentives are as in our benchmark model
since these types will send a report to maximize the probability that the new policy
is implemented. Furthermore, for small enough α this is even true for some types in
the bunching region of the voting-with-evidence mechanism. Since the worst-off types
were used to determine the verification probabilities, we cannot reduce the verification
probabilities of voting-with-evidence at all for small degrees of interdependence.
This suggests that there are only limited ways to improve upon voting-with-evidence
if α is small. One particularly simple way to improve upon a voting-with-evidence mech-
anism is to allow agents to abstain in this mechanism. Consider a setting where Fi is
symmetric around 0 for each i and adjust the given voting-with-evidence mechanism by
allowing for abstention and giving abstentions a weight of 0. Now, an agent with a pos-
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itive type close enough to 0 strictly prefers to abstain instead of casting a vote in favor,
which would give weight ω`i . This allows for more information being transmitted to the
principal without adding verification costs and this mechanism can therefore increase the
principal’s expected utility compared to a voting-with-evidence mechanism.
Limited commitment Following the standard approach in mechanism design, we as-
sume the principal commits to a mechanism. There are several ways in which our optimal
mechanism uses commitment of the principal and our results would change if the prin-
cipal could not commit. Most importantly, the principal commits to costly verifications
although in equilibrium he will never find an agent lying. Secondly, as explained above,
the decision rule is not the first-best for the principal since he distorts the decision by
bunching agents and by using net types. This is similar to the use of commitment in
standard mechanism design, where principal’s often commit to ex-post inefficient out-
comes. Thirdly, in our model the principal commits to penalize an agent that is found
lying. Note however that this third component is not used by the principal to commit to
unreasonable penalties. Suppose in a voting-with-evidence mechanism agent i deviates
and reports t1i although his true type is ti. This could only affect the decision if agent i’s
report is decisive. In this case, his report is audited and the penalty for agent i will be to
do the opposite of what agent i prefers. This coincides with the decision if agent i would
have been truthful and reported ti in the first place because agent i is decisive. In this
sense we are not using commitment to carry out unreasonable penalties, the penalty rule
uses just as much commitment as the decision rule does if no one lied.
The fact that commitment matters is typical for models of costly verification, and
contrasts with some models of evidence which show that commitment is not necessary
(see, e.g., Ben-Porath et al. (2019)). One reason for the difference is that, with costly
verification, the principal will anticipate the verification costs induced by a given decision
rule and deviate from the first-best rule in order to reduce these costs. This effect is not
present in models with evidence that have no verification costs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Revelation principle
In this section of the Appendix we show that it is without loss of generality to restrict
attention to the class of direct mechanisms as we define them in Section 2. Similar
versions of the revelation principle have been obtained in Townsend (1988) and Ben-
Porath et al. (2014). We will proceed in two steps. The first step is a revelation principle
argument where we establish that any indirect mechanism can be implemented via a
direct mechanism. In the second step we show that direct mechanisms can be expressed
as a tuple pd, a, ℓq, where d specifies the decision, ai specifies if agent i is verified, and ℓi
specifies what happens if agent i is revealed to be lying.
Step 1: It is without loss of generality to restrict attention to direct mechanisms in
which truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Let pM1, ...,MI , x˜, y˜q be an indirect mechanism, and M “
Ś
iPI Mi, where each Mi
denotes the message space for agent i, x˜ : M ˆ T ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u is the decision function
specifying whether the policy is implemented, and y˜ : M ˆ T ˆ I ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u is
the verification function specifying whether an agent is verified.11 Fix a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium σ of the game induced by the indirect mechanism.12
In the corresponding direct mechanism, let Ti be the message space for agent i. Define
x : T ˆ T ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u as xpt1, t, sq “ x˜pσpt1q, t, sq and y : T ˆ T ˆ I ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u
as ypt1, t, i, sq “ y˜pσpt1q, t, i, sq. Since σ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the original game,
truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the direct mechanism.
This implies that in both equilibria the same decision is taken and the same agents are
verified.
Note that in any feasible direct mechanism the decision whether or not to verify an
agent cannot depend on his true type, hence ypt1i, t´i, t
1
i, t´i, i, sq “ ypt
1
i, t´i, t, i, sq. Also,
if agent i was not verified, the implementation decision cannot depend on his true type,
xpt, t, sq “ xpt, t1i, t´i, sq.
Step 2: Any direct mechanism can be written as a tuple pd, a, ℓq, where
d : T ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u, ai : T ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u, and ℓi : T ˆ Ti ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u.
11To describe possibly stochastic mechanisms we introduce a random variable s that is uniformly
distributed on r0, 1s and only observed by the principal. This random variable is one way to correlate
the verification and the decision on the policy.
12In the game induced by the indirect mechanism, whenever the principal verifies agent i nature draws
a type t˜i P Ti as the outcome of the verification. Perfect verification implies that t˜i equals the true type
of agent i with probability 1. The strategies mi P Mi specify an action for each information set where
agent i takes an action, even if this information set is never reached with strictly positive probability.
In particular, they specify actions for information sets in which the outcome of the verification does not
agree with the true type.
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Let
dpt, sq “ xpt, t, sq
aipt, sq “ ypt, t, i, sq and
ℓipt
1
i, t´i, ti, sq “ xpt
1
i, t´i, ti, t´i, sq.
On the equilibrium path pd, a, ℓq implements the same outcome as px, yq by definition.
Suppose instead agent i of type ti reports t
1
i and all other agents report t´i truthfully.
Denoting t1 “ pt1i, t´iq, the decision taken in the mechanism pd, a, ℓq if the type profile is
t and the report profile is t1 is
r1´ aipt
1, sqsdpt1, sq ` aipt
1, sq ℓipt
1
i, ti, t´i, sq
“ r1´ ypt1, t1, i, sqsxpt1, t1, sq ` ypt1, t1, i, sq xpt1, t, sq
“
#
xpt1, t, sq if ypt1, t1, i, sq “ 1
xpt1, t1, sq if ypt1, t1, i, sq “ 0,
If ypt1, t1, i, sq “ 1, the decision is xpt1, t, sq under both formulations. Instead, if
ypt1, t1, i, sq “ 0 then ypt1, t, i, sq “ 0 (since the decision to verify agent i cannot depend
on his true type), and hence the decision on the policy must coincide with the case when
agent i is verified and reports t1i, xpt
1, t1, sq “ xpt1, t, sq We conclude that the decision is
the same in both formulations of the mechanism if one agent deviates. Since truth-telling
is an equilibrium in the mechanism px, yq, it is therefore an equilibrium in the mechanism
pd, a, ℓq, which consequently implements the same decision and verification rules.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section of the Appendix we show that a voting-with-evidence mechanism maximizes
the expected utility of the principal. The first step in the proof of Theorem 1 is to
construct a relaxed problem for the principal where the optimization is only over decision
rules, compared to maximizing jointly of decision and verification rules in the original
problem. The solution to the relaxed problem always yields weakly higher value than the
solution to the original optimization problem (Lemma 3). In the second step we show
that the solution to the relaxed problem is a voting-with evidence mechanism: first we
establish this for finite type spaces (Lemma 4) and then extend the result to infinite
type spaces (Lemma 5). To finish the proof we construct verification rules such that the
solution to the relaxed problem is feasible for the original problem and achieves the same
objective value. This proves Theorem 1.
We will show that the problem below is a relaxed version of the principal’s maximiza-
tion problem as defined in (P):
max
0ďdď1
Et
”ř
i
dptqrti ´ c˜iptiqs ` ci
´
1T`
i
ptiq inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´irdpt
1
i, t´iqs ´ 1T´
i
ptiq sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´irdpt
1
i, t´iqs
¯ı
(R)
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where 1T`
i
ptiq denotes the indicator function for T
`
i , 1T´
i
ptiq the indicator function for
T´i , and c˜iptiq “ ci if ti P T
`
i and c˜iptiq “ ´ci if ti P T
´
i .
For each mechanism pd, aq let VP pd, aq denote value of the objective in problem (P),
and for each decision rule d let VRpdq denote the objective value in problem (R).
Lemma 3. For any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism pd, aq, VP pd, aq ď VRpdq.
Proof.
VP pd, aq “ Et
«ÿ
i
dptqrti ´ c˜iptiqs ` ci1T`
i
ptiqrdptq ´ aiptqs ´ ci1T´
i
ptiqrdptq ` aiptqs
ff
ďEt
«ÿ
i
dptqrti ´ c˜iptiqs ` ci1T`
i
ptiqrdptqp1 ´ aiptqqs ´ ci1T´
i
ptiqrdptqp1 ´ aiptqq ` aiptqs
ff
(12)
ďEt
«ÿ
i
dptqrti ´ c˜iptiqs ` ci1T`
i
ptiq inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´irdpt
1
i, t´iqs ´ ci1T´
i
ptiq sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´irdpt
1
i, t´iqs
ff
(13)
“VRpdq.
The first inequality holds because ´aiptq ď ´dptqaiptq and dptqaiptq ě 0. The second
inequality follows from the fact that pd, aq is BIC.
The significance of the relaxed problem lies in the fact that for any optimal solution
d to problem (R), we can construct verification rules a such that pd, aq is feasible and
VP pd, aq “ VRpdq. This implies that d is part of an optimal solution to problem (P).
We now describe an optimal solution to the relaxed problem for finite type spaces.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the type space T is finite. Problem (R) is solved by a voting-
with-evidence mechanism.
Proof. Let d˚ denote an optimal solution to (R), let ϕ`i ” inft1
i
PT`
i
Et´ird
˚pt1i, t´iqs and
ϕ´i ” supt1
i
PT´
i
Et´ird
˚pt1i, t´iqs, and observe that ϕ
´
i ď ϕ
`
i .
Consider the following auxiliary maximization problem:
max
0ďdď1
Et
“ř
i dptqrti ´ c˜iptiqs
‰
(Aux)
s.t. for all i P I:
Et´irdptqs ě ϕ
`
i for all ti P T
`
i , and
Et´irdptqs ď ϕ
´
i for all ti P T
´
i ,
Clearly, d˚ also solves the auxiliary problem. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem (Arrow,
Hurwicz and Uzawa 1961, Luenberger 1969) implies that there exist Lagrange multipliers
λ˚i ptiq, such that λ
˚
i ptiq ě 0 for ti P T
`
i and λ
˚
i ptiq ď 0 for ti P T
´
i and such that d
˚
maximizes
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Lpd, λ˚q “ Et
”ÿ
i
dptqpti ´ c˜iptiqq
ı
`
ÿ
i
ÿ
tiPTi
´
λ˚i ptiq
`
Et´irdpti, t´iqs ´ ϕiptiq
˘¯
“
ÿ
tPT
dptq
ÿ
i
´
ti ´ c˜iptiq `
λ˚i ptiq
fiptiq
¯
fptq ` constant,
where
ϕiptiq :“
#
ϕ`i if ti P T
`
i
ϕ´i if ti P T
´
i .
Setting h˚i ptiq :“ ti ´ ciptiq `
λ˚
i
ptiq
fiptiq
and ignoring the constant in the Lagrangian, we
observe that d˚ maximizes the function
gpd, h˚q “
ÿ
tPT
ÿ
i
dptqfptqh˚i ptiq. (14)
Let
α`i “ inf tiPT`i
tti|Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs ą ϕ
`
i u ´ ci (15)
α´i “ suptiPT´i
tti|Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs ă ϕ
´
i u ` ci (16)
and define
h¯iptiq :“
$’’’&
’’’%
1
µipA
`
i
q
ř
tiPA
`
i
fiptiqh
˚
i ptiq if ti P T
`
i and ti ď α
`
i ` ci
1
µipA
´
i
q
ř
tiPA
´
i
fiptiqh
˚
i ptiq if ti P T
´
i and ti ě α
´
i ´ ci
ti ´ c˜iptiq otherwise,
where A`i “ tti P T
`
i |ti ă α
`
i ` ciu, A
´
i “ tti P T
´
i |ti ą α
´
i ´ ciu, and µipAq denotes the
measure induced by Fi. Let A
c
i “ TizpA
`
i Y A
´
i q and Ai “ A
`
i Y A
´
i .
Claim 1. d˚ also maximizes gpd, h¯q “
ř
tPT
ř
i dptqfptqh¯iptiq.
Step 1: λ˚ptiq “ 0 for ti P A
c
i .
Complementary slackness implies λ˚i pα
`
i ` ciq “ 0. Moreover, for every ti P T
`
i such
that ti ą α
`
i ` ci, we get ti ´ ci `
λ˚
i
ptiq
fiptiq
ě α`i and hence for every optimal solution to
the Lagrangian d that Et´irdpti, t´iqs ě Et´irdpα
`
i ` ci, t´iqs ą ϕ
`
i . This implies that
for ti P T
`
i X A
c
i , λ
˚
i ptiq “ 0 by complementary slackness. Analogous arguments for
ti P T
´
i X A
c
i apply. Thus, λ
˚ptiq “ 0 for ti P A
c
i .
Step 2: gpd˚, h˚q “ gpd˚, h¯q.
First, observe that h˚i ptiq “ h¯iptiq for ti P A
c
i , ϕ
`
i “ Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs for ti P A
`
i , and
ϕ´i “ Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs for ti P A
´
i . This implies
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gpd˚, h˚q “
ÿ
i
” ÿ
tiPAi
h˚i ptiqfiptiqEt´ird
˚ptqs `
ÿ
tiPAci
h˚i ptiqfiptiqEt´ird
˚ptqs
ı
“
ÿ
i
” ÿ
tiPA
`
i
h˚i ptiqfiptiqϕ
`
i `
ÿ
tiPA
´
i
h˚i ptiqfiptiqϕ
´
i `
ÿ
tiPAci
h¯iptiqfiptiqEt´ird
˚ptqs
ı
“
ÿ
i
” ÿ
tiPA
`
i
h¯iptiqfiptiqϕ
`
i `
ÿ
tiPA
´
i
h¯iptiqfiptiqϕ
´
i `
ÿ
tiPAci
h¯iptiqfiptiqEt´ird
˚ptqs
ı
“
ÿ
i
” ÿ
tiPAi
h¯iptiqfiptiqEt´ird
˚ptqs `
ÿ
tiPAci
h¯iptiqfiptiqEt´ird
˚ptqs
ı
“ gpd˚, h¯q.
Step 3: gpd˚, h¯q “ gpd˚, h˚q “ max0ďdď1 gpd, h
˚q ě max0ďdď1 gpd, h¯q.
The first equality follows from Step 2 and the second holds because d˚ maximizes
gpd, h˚q by construction.
Let hi : Ti Ñ R be any real-valued function, and for each such function hi define
Hiptiq :“ hiptiqfiptiq and denote by Hi ” pHiptiqqtiPTi . Fix an agent i P I, and define a
function Ψ : R|Ti| Ñ R, as ΨpHiq :“ max0ďdď1
ř
tPT dptq
“
f´ipt´iqHiptiq`
ř
jPI´i
fptqh˚j ptjq
‰
.
The function Ψ is convex, since it is a maximum over linear functions. It is also sym-
metric, since permuting the vector Hi does not change the value of Ψ. Thus, Ψ is Schur-
convex. By construction, H˚i (defined as H
˚
i ptiq “ h
˚
i ptiqfiptiq) majorizes H¯i (defined as
H¯iptiq “ h¯iptiqfiptiq). Therefore we obtain that,
ΨpH˚i q ě ΨpH¯iq
We have now shown that if we replace h˚i for agent i with its average h¯i we have that
d˚ remains the maximizer of max0ďdď1 gpd, h
˚
I´i
hiq. By repeating this argument agent by
agent we can conclude that,
max
0ďdď1
gpd, h˚q “ max
0ďdď1
ÿ
tPT
ÿ
iPI
dptqf´ipt´iqH
˚
i ptiq ě max
0ďdď1
ÿ
tPT
ÿ
iPI
dptqf´ipt´iqH¯iptiq “ max
0ďdď1
gpd, h¯q.
This proves the Claim 1.
Hence, every solution to the Lagrangian can be described as follows:
dptq “
#
1 if
ř
wiptiq ą 0
0 if
ř
wiptiq ă 0,
where
wiptiq “
$’’&
’%
ω`i if ti P T
`
i and ti ď α
`
i ` ci
ω´i if ti P T
´
i and ti ě α
´
i ´ ci
ti ´ ciptiq otherwise
(17)
for constants tω`i , ω
´
i uiPI . Since d
˚ maximizes the Lagrangian by assumption, we conclude
that it takes this form.
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Note that ω`i ě suptiPA`i
tti ´ ciu since λ
˚
i ptiq ě 0 for ti P A
`
i . Also, ω
`
i ď α
`
i ,
since otherwise we would get, for ti P A
`
i , Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs ě Et´ird
˚pα`i ´ ci, t´iqs ą ϕ
`
i ,
contradicting the definition of A`i . Analogous arguments imply inftiPA´i
tti ` ciu ď ω
´ ď
α´i . This implies that we can replace α
`
i (α
´
i ) with ω
`
i (ω
´
i ) in the definition of the
weight function wi in (17) above without changing the outcome of the mechanism in any
way.
As the next step in the proof we show that voting-with-evidence mechanisms are also
optimal for infinite type space.
Lemma 5. Suppose that T is an infinite type space. Problem (R) is solved by a voting-
with-evidence mechanism.
Proof. Let F`i and F
´
i denote the conditional distributions induced by Fi on T
`
i and T
´
i ,
respectively. We first construct a discrete approximation of the type space: For i P I,
n ě 1, li “ 1, . . . , 2
n`1, let
Sipn, liq :“
#
tti P T
`
i |
li´1
2n
ď F`i ptiq ă
li
2n
u for li ď 2
n
tti P T
´
i |
li´2
n´1
2n
ď F´i ptiq ă
li´2
n
2n
u for li ą 2
n,
which form partitions of T`i and T
´
i , and denote by F
n
i the set consisting of all possible
unions of the Sipn, liq. Let l “ pl1, ..., lnq and Spn, lq “
ś
iPI Sipn, liq, which defines a
partition of T , and denote by Fn the induced σ-algebra.
Let pRnq denote the relaxed problem with the additional restriction that d is measur-
able with respect to Fn. Then the constraint set has non-empty interior and an optimal
solution to pRnq exists. Define t˜iptiq :“
1
µipSipn,liqq
ş
Sipn,liq
sdFi for ti P Sipn, liq, where µi
denotes the measure induced by Fi. The arguments for finite type spaces imply that the
following rule is an optimal solution to pRnq for some ω`,ni , ω
´,n
i :
rni ptiq “
$’’&
’’%
ω
`,n
i ´ ci if ti P T
`
i and t˜iptiq ď ω
`,n
i
ω
´,n
i ` ci if ti P T
´
i and t˜iptiq ě ω
´,n
i
t˜iptiq ´ ciptiq otherwise
dnptq “
#
1 if
ř
rni ptiq ą 0
0 if
ř
rni ptiq ă 0.
Let ω`i :“ limnÑ8ω
`n
i and ω
´
i :“ limnÑ8ω
´,n
i (by potentially choosing a convergent subse-
quence). Define
riptiq “
$’’&
’’%
ω`i ´ ci if ti P T
`
i and t˜iptiq ď ω
`,n
i
ω´i ` ci if ti P T
´
i and t˜iptiq ě ω
´,n
i
ti ´ c˜iptiq otherwise
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dptq “
#
1 if
ř
riptiq ą 0
0 if
ř
riptiq ă 0.
Then, for all i and ti, Et´ird
npti, t´iqs “ Probr
ř
j‰i r
n
j ptjq ě ´r
n
i ptiqs converges point-
wise almost everywhere to Et´irdpti, t´iqs. This implies that the marginals converge in
L1-norm and hence the objective value of dn converges to the objective value of d. This
implies that d is an optimal solution to (R), since if there was a solution achieving a
strictly higher objective value, there would exist Fn-measurable solutions achieving a
strictly higher objective value for all n large enough. Therefore, a voting-with-evidence
mechanism solves problem (R).
Now we have all the parts required to establish our main result Theorem 1 that voting-
with-evidence mechanisms are optimal.
Proof of Theorem 1. Denote by d˚ the solution to problem (R). We first construct a
verification rule a˚ such that pd˚, a˚q is Bayesian incentive compatible and then argue
that VP pd
˚, a˚q “ VRpd
˚q. Given that VP pd, aq ď VRpdq holds for any incentive compatible
mechanism, this implies that pd˚, a˚q solves (P).
Let a˚ be such that agent i is verified whenever he is decisive. Then a˚i ptq “ a
˚
i ptqd
˚ptq
for all ti P T
`
i (if d
˚ptq “ 0 then type ti P T
`
i is not decisive), and d
˚ptq “ d˚ptqr1´ a˚i ptqs
for all ti P T
´
i (if a
˚
i ptq “ 1 then d
˚ptq “ 0). Hence, inequality (12) holds as an equality
for pd˚, a˚q.
Note that in mechanism pd˚, a˚q, all incentive constraints are binding and therefore
inequality (13) holds as an equality as well. We therefore conclude VP pd
˚, a˚q “ VRpd
˚q.
Proof of Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, suppose ω`1 ď ´ω
´
2 and consider
changing ω´2 (the other cases are analogous). This matters only if agent 2 has a neg-
ative type and 1 has a positive type. We consider two cases: (a) a change to ω´
1
2 such
that ω`1 ď ´ω
´1
2 ; (b) a change such that ω
`
1 ą ´ω
´1
2 .
Case (a):
Using weight ω´
1
2 such that ´ω
`
1 ě ω
´1
2 ą ω
´
2 instead of ω
´
2 matters only if agent 1’s
type satisfies ω´2 ď ´t1 ` c1 ď ω
´1
2 . Conditional on such a type, the expected utility
of the principal from using weight ω´2 is 0. On the other hand, using weight ω
´1
2 gives
conditional expected utility ofż
0
´8
pt1 ` t2 ´ c1q1t1´c1`t2`c2ě0 ´ c21t1´c1`t2`c2ă0dF2.
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The definition of ω´2 impliesż
0
´8
t2dF2 “
ż
0
´8
mintω´
2
, t2 ` c2udF2
ď
ż
0
´8
mint´t1 ` c1, t2 ` c2udF2
“
ż
0
´8
p´t1 ` c1q1t1´c1`t2`c2ě0 ` pt2 ` c2q1t1´c1`t2`c2ă0dF2.
Subtracting
ş
0
´8
t2dF2 from both sides and multiplying by ´1, this implies
0 ě
ż
0
´8
pt1 ` t2 ´ c1q1t1´c1`t2`c2ě0 ´ c21t1´c1`t2`c2ă0dF2,
and hence the principal is better off using weight ω´2 . Similar arguments also show that
the principal is worse off using a cutoff ω´
1
2 ă ω
´
2 .
Case (b): We can think of this case in two steps. First, a change such that ωˆ´2 “ ´ω
`
1 .
As shown in Case (a), this reduces the principal’s welfare. Second, a further change to
ω´
1
2 , which only changes the decision if both agents cast a vote. The effect of this second
change non-positive if and only if
0 ě
ż ω`
1
`c1
0
ż
0
´ω´
1
´c2
t1 ` t2dF2 dF1
` c1r1´ F1pω
`
1
` c1qsrF2p0q ´ F2p´ω
´
1
´ c2qs ´ c2rF1pω
`
1
` c1q ´ F1p0qsF2p´ω
´
1
´ c2q.
This is equivalent to
0 ě
 
Ert1|0 ď t1 ď ω
`
1
` c1s ` Ert2|0 ě t2 ě ´ω
`
1
´ c2s
(
rF1pω
`
1
` c1q ´ F1p0qsrF2p0q ´ F2p´ω
`
1
´ c2qs
` c1r1´ F1pω
`
1 ` c1qsrF2p0q ´ F2p´ω
´
1 ´ c2qs ´ c2rF1pω
`
1 ` c1q ´ F1p0qsF2p´ω
´
1 ´ c2q,
or to
0 ěErt1|0 ď t1 ď ω
`
1 ` c1s ` Ert2|0 ě t2 ě ´ω
`
1 ´ c2s
` c1
1´ F1p0q
F1pω
`
1 ` c1q ´ F1p0q
´ c1 ´ c2
F2p0q
F2p0q ´ F2p´ω
`
1 ´ c2q
` c2 (18)
However, the definition of ω`1 impliesż 8
0
t1dF1 “
ż 8
ω`
1
`c1
t1 ´ c1dF1 ` rF pω
`
1 ` c1q ´ F p0qsω
`
1
ô ω`
1
“ Ert1|0 ď t1 ď ω
`
1
` c1s ´ c1 ` c1
1´ F1p0q
F1pω
`
1 ` c1q ´ F1p0q
. (19)
Similarly, the definition of ω´2 and the fact that ω
´
2 ď ´ω
`
1 imply
Ert2|t2 ă 0s “ Ermintω
´
2
´ c2, t2u ` c2|t2 ă 0s
ď Ermint´ω`
1
´ c2, t2u ` c2|t2 ă 0s.
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Rearranging this inequality yields
Ert2| ´ ω
`
1 ´ c2 ď t2 ă 0s ´ c2
F2p0q
F2p0q ´ F2pω
`
1 ´ c2q
ď ´ω`1 ´ c2. (20)
Plugging (19) and (20) in (18), we see that (18) holds. We conclude that the principal is
better off using weight ω´2 .
A.3 Omitted proofs from Section 4
Proof of Theorem 2.
The proof applies Theorem 6 in (Gutmann et al. 1991) to a discrete approximation of A
and by taking limits we establish Theorem 2.
Let Sipn, liq denote the interval,
Sipn, liq :“ rF
´1
i ppli ´ 1q2
´nq, F´1i pli2
´nqq, i P I, n ě 1 and li “ 1, ..., 2
n.
For a given n the function Sipn, ¨q form a partition of Ai such that each partition el-
ement Sipn, kq has the same likelihood. Let F
n
i denote the set consisting of all pos-
sible unions of the Sipn, liq. Note further that F
n
i Ă F
n`1
i . Let l “ pl1, . . . , lIq and
Spn, lq :“
ś
iPI Sipn, liq. Thus, for a given n the function Spn, ¨q defines a partition of A
such that each partition element Spn, lq has the same likelihood.
Define the following averaged function,
gpn, lq :“ 2In
ż
Spn,lq
gptqdF.
The function gpn, lq is an I-dimensional tensor. Now consider the marginals of gpn, lq with
respect to l´i, i.e., El´irgpn, li, l´iqs, each such marginal in dimension i is nondecreasing
in li. By Theorem 6 in (Gutmann et al. 1991) there exists another tensor g
1pn, lq with the
same marginals as gpn, lq such that g1pn, lq is nondecreasing in l. Now define g1n : T Ñ r0, 1s
by letting g1nptq :“ g
1pn, lq for all t P Spn, lq.
Note that g1n is nondecreasing in each coordinate and hence satisfiesż
ess inf
tiPB
g1npti, t´iqdF´i “ ess inf
tiPB
ż
g1npti, t´iqdF´i (21)ż
ess sup
tiPB
g1npti, t´iqdF´i “ ess sup
tiPB
ż
g1npti, t´iqdF´i. (22)
Moreover, ż
Sipn,liq
ż
A´i
gpti, t´iqdF´i dFi “
ż
Sipn,liq
ż
A´i
g1npti, t´iqdF´i dFi, (23)
and hence gptq ´ g1nptq integrates to zero over sets of the form Sipn, liq ˆ A´i for every
Sipn, liq P F
n
i .
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Draw a weak˚-convergent subsequence from the sequence tg1nu (which is possible by
Alaoglu’s theorem) and denote its limit by gˆ. This function rule satisfies 0 ď gˆ ď 1 and
its marginals are equal almost everywhere to the marginals of g because of (23).
Since g1n Ñ
˚ gˆ, we get
ess inf tiPB g
1
npti, t´iq Ñ ess inf tiPB gˆpti, t´iq for almost every t´i. Moreover,
ess inf tiPB
ş
A´i
g1npti, t´iqdF´i Ñ ess inf tiPB
ş
A´i
gˆpti, t´iqdF´i. Note further that,
Et´irinftiPT`i
gˆpti, t´iqs ď inftiPT`i
Et´irgˆpti, t´iqs always holds. By way of contradiction
suppose now that for some i,ż
ess inf
tiPB
gˆpti, t´iqdF´i ă ess inf
tiPB
ż
gˆpti, t´iqdF´i.
13
This implies ż
ess inf
tiPB
g1npti, t´iqdF´i ă ess inf
tiPB
ż
g1npti, t´iqdF´i
for n large enough, contradicting (21) and thereby proving the first equality in the theo-
rem. Analogous arguments apply for the second equality in the theorem, thus establishing
our claim.
Proof of Theorem 3.
It follows from Theorem 2 that there exists a decision rule dˆ : T ˆ r0, 1s Ñ t0, 1u that
induces the same marginals almost everywhere and for which
inf
tiPT
`
i
Et´i,srdˆpti, t´i, sqs “ Et´ir inf
tiPT
`
i
Esdˆpti, t´i, sqs and
sup
tiPT
´
i
Et´i,srdˆpti, t´i, sqs “ Et´ir sup
tiPT
´
i
Esdˆpti, t´i, sqs.
We now construct a verification rule aˆ such that the mechanism pdˆ, aˆq satisfies the
claim. By setting
aˆipt, sq :“
$&
%
1
Probspdˆpt,sq“1q
´
Es1rdˆpt, s
1qs ´ inf t1
i
PT`
i
Es1rdˆpt
1
i, t´i, s
1qs
¯
if dˆpt, sq “ 1
1
Probspdˆpt,sq“0q
´
supt1
i
PT´
i
Es1rdˆpt
1
i, t´i, s
1qs ´ Es1rdˆpt, s
1qs
¯
if dˆpt, sq “ 0,
13If the inequality only holds for the infimum but not for the essential infimum, we can adjust gˆ on a
set of measure zero such that our claim holds.
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the mechanism pdˆ, aˆq satisfies (5) as an equality for all ti, t´i:
Esrdˆpt, sqp1´ aˆipt, sqqs “
ż
s:dˆpt,sq“1
1´
1
Probspdˆpt, sq “ 1q
„
Es1rdˆpt, s
1qs ´ inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Es1rdˆpt
1
i, t´i, s
1qs

ds
“
ż
s:dˆpt,sq“1
1´
1
Probspdˆpt, sq “ 1q
»
—– ż
s1:dˆpt,s1q“1
Probs1pdˆpt, s
1q “ 1qds1 ´ inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Es1rdˆpt
1
i, t´i, s
1qs
fi
ffifl ds
“
ż
s:dˆpt,sq“1
1
Probspdˆpt, sq “ 1q
„
inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Es1rdˆpt
1
i, t´i, s
1qs

ds
“ inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Esrdˆpt
1
i, t´i, sqs.
Similarly, the mechanism satisfies (6) as an equality and hence it is EPIC.
Moreover,
Et´i,sraˆipt, sqs “ Et´i,s
”
aˆipt, sq ` dˆpt, sqr1´ aˆipt, sqs ´ dˆpt, sqr1´ aˆipt, sqs
ı
“ Et´i
«
sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Esdˆpt
1
i, t´i, sq ´ inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Esdˆpt
1
i, t´i, sq
ff
“ sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ´ inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs
ď Et´i,sraipt, sqs,
where the second equality follows from the fact that (5) and (6) are binding, the third
equality follows from Step 1 and the fact that d and dˆ induce the same marginals, and the
inequality follows from the fact that pd, aq is BIC. Hence, by potentially adding additional
verifications one obtains an EPIC mechanism that induces the same interim decision and
verification probabilities.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Consider the relaxed problem
max
0ďdď1
Et
”ř
i
dptqrti ´
c˜iptiq
p
s ` ci
p
´
1T`
i
ptiq inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´irdpt
1
i, t´iqs ´ 1T´
i
ptiq sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´irdpt
1
i, t´iqs
¯ı
s.t. (7) and (8) (R˜)
For any mechanism pd, aq, let VP˜ pd, aq denote the expected utility of the principal given
mechanism pd, aq and let VR˜pdq denote the value achieved by the decision rule d in the
relaxed problem.
Lemma 6. For any mechanism pd, aq that is Bayesian incentive compatible in the imper-
fect verification setting, VP˜ pd, aq ď VR˜pdq.
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Proof. Note that Lemma 2 implies that
@ti P T
`
i : Et´i,sraipti, t´i, sqdpti, t´i, sqs ě
1
p
„
Et´i,srdpti, t´iqs ´ inf
tiPT
`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs

and
(24)
@ti P T
´
i : Et´i,sraipti, t´i, sqr1´ dpti, t´i, sqss ě
1
p
«
sup
tiPT
`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ´ Et´i,srdpti, t´iqs
ff
(25)
Hence,
VP˜ pd, aq “ Et
«ÿ
i
dptqti ´ aiptqci
ff
ď Et
«ÿ
i
dptqti ´ 1T`
i
ptiqdptqaiptqci ´ 1T´
i
ptiqr1 ´ dptqsaiptqci
ff
(26)
ď Eti
«ÿ
i
Et´irdptqsti ´ 1T`
i
ptiq
1
p
«
Et´i,srdpti, t´iqs ´ inf
tiPT
`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sq
ff
ci
´1T´
i
ptiq
1
p
«
sup
tiPT
`
i
Et´i,srdpt
1
i, t´i, sqs ´ Et´i,srdpti, t´iqs
ff
ci
ff
(27)
“ VR˜pdq
Lemma 7. Suppose T is finite. The decision rule stated in Theorem 4 solves problem
(R˜).
Proof. Let d˚ denote an optimal solution to the relaxed problem (R˜) above, and define
ϕ`i ” inft1
i
PT`
i
Et´ird
˚pt1i, t´iqs and ϕ
´
i ” supt1
i
PT´
i
Et´ird
˚pt1i, t´iqs. Then d
˚ also solves the
following problem:
max
0ďdď1
Et
“ř
i dptqrti ´
c˜iptiq
p
s
‰
(Aux)
s.t. for all i P I :
ϕ`i ď Et´idptq ď
ϕ`i
1´ p
for all ti P T
`
i , and
ϕ´i ´ p
1´ p
ď Et´idptq ď ϕ
´
i for all ti P T
´
i .
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem implies that there exist Lagrange multipliers λiptiq and
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µiptiq such that d
˚ maximizes the Lagrangian:
Lpd, λ, µq “ Et
”ÿ
i
dptqpti ´
c˜iptiq
p
q
ı
`
ÿ
i
ÿ
tiPT
`
i
´
λiptiq
`
Et´irdpti, t´iqs ´ ϕ
`
i
˘
` µiptiq
` ϕ`i
1´ p
´ Et´irdpti, t´iqs
˘¯
`
ÿ
i
ÿ
tiPT
´
i
´
λiptiq
`
Et´irdpti, t´iqs ´ ϕ
´
i
˘
` µiptiq
`ϕ´i ´ p
1´ p
´ Et´irdpti, t´iqs
˘¯
Define hiptiq :“ ti ´
c˜iptiq
p
` λiptiq`µiptiq
fiptiq
and let
α`i “ inftiPT`i
tti|Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs ą ϕ
`
i u
α´i “ suptiPT´i
tti|Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs ă ϕ
´
i u
β`i “ suptiPT`i
tti|Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs ă
ϕ`
i
1´p
u
β´i “ inftiPT´i
tti|Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs ą
ϕ´
i
´p
1´p
u.
Define A`i “ tti P T
`
i |ti ă α
`
i u, A
´
i “ tti P T
´
i |ti ą α
´
i u, B
`
i “ tti P T
`
i |ti ą β
`
i u,
B´i “ tti P T
´
i |ti ă β
´
i u, and
h¯iptiq :“
$’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’%
1
µipA
`
i
q
ř
tiPA
`
i
fiptiqhiptiq if ti P A
`
i
1
µipB
`
i
q
ř
tiPB
`
i
fiptiqhiptiq if ti P B
`
i
1
µipA
´
i
q
ř
tiPA
´
i
fiptiqhiptiq if ti P A
´
i
1
µipB
´
i
q
ř
tiPB
´
i
fiptiqhiptiq if ti P B
´
i
ti ´ c˜iptiq otherwise.
The same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4 imply that d˚ maximizes
ř
i
ř
t fptqdptqh¯iptiq.
Lemma 8. Suppose T is infinite. The decision rule stated in Theorem 4 solves problem
(R˜).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5 and hence omitted.
Proof of Theorem 4. Denote by d˚ the solution to problem R˜. For each i, define qi : Ti Ñ
r0, 1s as the solution to
Et´ird
˚pti, t´iq r1´ p ¨ qiptiqss “ inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´ird
˚pt1i, t´iqs , for ti P T
`
i and
Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqr1´ p ¨ qiptiqs “ sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´ird
˚pt1i, t´iqs ´ p ¨ qiptiqs , for ti P T
´
i .
We will now show that a solution qi exists. For ti P T
`
i , setting qiptiq “ 0 yields
Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqr1´ pqiptiqss “ Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqs ě inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´ird
˚pt1i, t´iqs
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and setting qiptiq “ 1 yields
Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqr1´ pqiptiqss “ Et´ird
˚pti, t´iqr1´ pss ď inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´ird
˚pt1i, t´iqs,
where the inequality follows from (7). The intermediate-value theorem hence implies the
existence of a solution qi. Similar arguments apply for ti P T
´
i .
Define
a˚i ptq :“
$’’&
’%
qiptiq if ti P T
`
i and d
˚ptq “ 1
qiptiq if ti P T
´
i and d
˚ptq “ 0
0 else.
For each i and for all ti P T
`
i ,
inf
t1
i
PT`
i
Et´i,srd
˚pt1i, t´i, sqs “ Et´i,srd
˚pti, t´i, sqr1´ p ¨ a
˚
i pti, t´i, sqss,
and for all ti P T
´
i ,
sup
t1
i
PT´
i
Et´i,srd
˚pt1i, t´i, sqs “ Et´i,srd
˚pti, t´i, sqr1´ p ¨ a
˚
i pti, t´i, sqs ` p ¨ a
˚
i pti, t´i, sqs.
Hence, pd˚, a˚q is Bayesian incentive compatible by Lemma 2 and inequality (27) holds
as an equality. By construction, ti P T
`
i implies dptqa
˚
i ptq “ a
˚
i ptq and ti P T
´
i implies
r1´dptqsa˚i ptq “ a
˚
i ptq. Therefore, inequality (26) also holds as an equality and we conclude
VP˜ pd
˚, a˚q “ VR˜pd
˚q. Hence, pd˚, a˚q is optimal.
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